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International Law and the American Hostages in Iran 
by Dr. Walter L. Williams, Jr.* 
For over ten weeks at this writing, the Ira-
nian Government has held fifty-three United 
States citizens in close confinement. Fifty-one 
of these Americans have privileged status as 
U.S. embassy personnel.' The Iranian Govern-
ment has held these Americans hostage for the 
return to Iran of Mohammed Riza Shah Pah-
levi, the former Iranian Head of State. 'I'he 
Iranian demand upon the U.S. Government for 
return of the Shah, made when he was per-
mitted to visit the U.S. solely to secure emer-
gency medical treatment, continues now, al-
though the Shah has departed U.S. territory. 
The seizure of these Americans and the re-
sulting crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations have 
drawn the close attention of governments and 
peoples around the world. In modern times, 
probably no other event has more compellingly 
raised the questions of international legal re-
sponsibility for protection of aliens in their per-
son and their civil liberties, and of the permis-
sible sanctions of self-help available to a gov-
ernment to protect its nationals abroad. Those 
two questions are the focus of this brief article 
for the Army Lawyer. 
These are important questions for military 
lawyers to consider. Although the current Ira-
nian crisis is a dramatic illustration of the per-
tinency of these questions, an appraisal of the 
turbulent world scene suggests that in the im-
mediate future the United States and other 
countries mus expect other instances of sub-
stantial mistreatment of their nationals abroad, 
including those having diplomatic status. The 
military strategies that governments may em-
ploy to protect their nationals abroad obviously 
will give rise to a wide range of legal problems 
calling for the services of military lawyers. 
Further, situations threatening serious per-
sonal deprivation to American citizens may 
arise where U.S. military elements are on the 
immediate scene and able to offer effective pro-
tection if employed immediately. The emergency 
situation may not permit the luxury of awaiting 
authorization to act from high governmental 
levels. In that context, military commanders 
will have to rely upon their lawyers for advice 
as to the permissibility under international law 
of military action to protect American citizens 
abroad. Thus, for military lawyers, a basic un-
derstanding of international law concerning 
the protection of aliens is vital. In dealing with 
the situation of the American hostages in Iran, 
this article discusses one of the most critical 
situations that arise: foreign governmental ac-
tion intentionally taken against American citi-
zens that causes them substantial personal dep-
rivation and threatens them with still more 
extreme deprivation. 
To show that the Iranian Government has 
engaged in multiple major violations of inter-
national law in the case of the American hos-
tages does not require a lengthy legal brief. 
First, the confinment of the. Americans clearly 
is an act chargeable to the Iranian Government. 
A well-organized group of Iranian private citi-
zens, rel?orted to be students, conducted the ini-
tial seizure of the American Embasy in Teheran 
and confinement therein of American citizens. 
To the present, this writer is unaware of any 
conclusive evidence that, prior to the seizure, 
the Ayatollah Ruhollah Mussavi Khom.eini (at 
that time the actual if not formally proclaimed 
Head of Government) or any other Iranian offi-
cial ordered, authorized, or with foreknowledge 
passively permitted the seizure. However, re-
gardless of its involvement in the initial seizure 
of the Embassy and the American citizens, the 
Iranian Government failed to take any action 
whatsoever to terminate the seizure. Further, 
the Ayatollah Khomeini and lesser officials 
quickly approved and expressly adopted as gov-
ernmental action the seizure and the contintJ,~d 
confinement of the American citizens, as well 
as the characterization of their status as hos-
tages for the return of the Shah to Iran. The 
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Iranians holding the Americans hostage have 
repeatedly said that they would release the 
Americans at the Ayatollah Khomeini's direc-
tion, but that direction has not been given. Thus, 
under any analysis the holding of the American 
hostages is an act of the Iranian Government. 
The Iranian seizure and confinement of .the 
Americans is a gross violation of conventional 
and customary international law. In our brief 
survey of the law here, we should note that, 
fundamentally, we are confronted with serious 
deprivations of civil liberties accorded by inter-
national law to these American citizens present 
in Iran. At this point in the analysis, we are 
not concerned with the special privileged status 
of most of these Americans as embassy person-
nel. Under the U.S.-Iranian Treaty of Amity, 
Economic Relations, and Consulate Rights,Z all 
American citizens presents in Iran are entitled 
to "receive the most constant protection and 
security" within the territory of Iran. If held 
"in custody," which presumes custody by prop-
erly empowered officials pursuant to regular 
process and for reasonable cause, Americans 
are "in every respect" to "receive reasonable 
and humane treatment." On their demand their 
diplomatic or consular representatives is to be 
"accorded full opportunity to safeguard" their 
interests. Each is to be "promptly informed of 
accusations against him, allowed full facilities 
reasonably necessary to his defense and given 
a prompt and impartial" determination of his 
case. 
These foregoing rights of the American 
hostages have been outrageously violated. This 
pertains not only to the specific details of their 
confinement, but as to the confinement itself. 
From the outset of their seizure, the publicly 
pronounced objective has been to hold the 
Americans as hostages for the return of the 
Shah to Iran, with various threats of increased 
deprivation to them (criminal proceedings, pris-
on confinement, even death) if the Shah does 
not return. Additionally, emphatic threats have 
been made that the hostages will be killed if 
the U.S. government attempts any use of force 
to release them. Under the laws of all st~tes, if 
a guard were to deliberately kill a defenseless 
prisoner, that would be murder. 
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Further, as regards holding these Americans 
as hostages, even under the law of war in situa-
tions of armed conflict, two of the most im-
portant prohibitions in the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of 
War3 (both Iran and the U.S. are parties) are 
the express prohibitions against the holding of 
civilians as hostages and of taking reprisals 
against civilians. These prohibitions, resulting 
from the massive cruelties against civilians in 
World War II, dramatize the unlawful conduct 
of the Iranian government in holding these 
Americans as hostages and in subjecting them 
to continuous deprivations as reprisal for the 
failure of the U.S. Government to return the 
Shah to Iran. Those deprivations include con-
finement in circumstances closely approximat-
ing solitary confinement; subjecting them to 
threats of possible long-term imprisonment or 
execution, and continuously exposing them to 
the possibility of death or injury if the inces-
santly demonstrating Iranian crowds should get 
out of control. 
As regards the various Iranian assertions 
that the hostages might or will be tried for 
crimes of espionage if the Shah does not return 
to Iran, the very fact that conducting the trials 
turns on the return of the Shah shows that the 
true objective for holding the Americans is not 
for the purpose of trial for alleged crimes. Fur-
ther, no formal charges have been made against 
any individual nor, to this writer's knowledge, 
has any specific act of criminal espionage by 
any individual even been formally alleged. At 
this point, the special status of virtually all of 
the American captives as U.S. embassy per-
sonnel becomes relevant. Under the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations,"' to which 
the U.S. and Iran are parties, these Americans, 
regardless of the particular subcategory of 
privileged status that applies to each individual, 
all share in a minimum "floor" of protection 
under that convention: the immunity from any 
form of arrest or detention and from criminal 
prosecution for acts performed in the course of 
their duties." The appropriate remedy for the 
Iranian Government, if it in good faith be-
lieved that at least some of the American cap-
tives had committed criminal espionage, would 
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be to demand that the U.S. government with-
draw those persons from Iran." Indeed, under 
the Vienna Convention, even in time of armed 
conflict, the host state is obligated not only to 
allow these personnel to depart at their will, 
but also, to provide adequate facilities to assist 
in their departure.' 
These foregoing rights are also, in general, 
long-standing hallowed rights under customary 
international law, which have been incorporated 
into these bilateral and multilateral interna-
tional agreements. 8 The conduct of the Iranian 
Government has rightly been condemned as a 
violation of international law by the general 
world community, through statements of gov-
ernmental officials, and by the chief authorita-
tive judicial and political agencies of the United 
Nations Organization, the International Court 
of Justice and the Security Council. All have 
called for the immediate release of the Ameri-
cans. 
With the Iranian Government standing in vio-
lation of international law, the question is what 
are the permissible sanctions that may be em-
ployed against that government to terminate 
continuing deprivations against the American 
citizens. First, the principal sanctioning goals 
in a situation of violation of international law 
of protection of aliens are (a) immediate deter-
rence and (b) restoration, that is, sanctions 
may be employed first, to deter a government 
from acting to cause impermissible deprivation 
to aliens or to increase the level of such depriva-
tion and, second, to terminate an impermissible 
deprivation, where the target government's 
action is one of continuing nature, e.g., unlaw-
ful confinement. The anticipated or actual dep-
rivation may range from very minor effect to 
grave injury or death. The nature and extent of 
the deprivation obviously affects the nature of 
the sanction that may lawfully be employed. 
As regards the range of permissible sanctions 
in the Iranian situation, we should first consider 
the employment of sanctions by community 
agencies acting for the global community under 
the U.N. Charter. Undoubtedly, in either the 
situation of immediate deterrence or of restora-
tion, the Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter could either authorize 
or order the employment of non-military sanc-
tions by any or all member states and could 
authorize the employment of military sanctions 
of whatever degree of coerciveness it judged 
necessary to deter or to terminate the Iranian 
Government's unlawful conduct against Ameri-
can citizens. The U.S. Government indeed re-
quested the Security Council to order economic 
sanctions against Iran, in light of the Iranian 
Government's failure to obey the orders of the 
Security Council and of the International Court 
of Justice to release the American hostages. 
However, events have highlighted the difficul-
ties of exclusive reliance on community sanc-
tions. These difficulties include (a) where aliens 
are threatened with imminent deprivation, 
securing timely deterrent community action by 
the Security Council under even the optimum of 
operating circumstances; (b) the Council's lack 
of authority to order the national employment 
of military forces, or itself to deploy a U.N. 
military unit, absent prior agreement by mem-
ber states to place military forces at the Coun-
cil's disposal, and (c) the power of any Perrna-
nent Member of the Security Council to exer-
cise a veto to prevent the Council from char-
acterizing the propriety of the offending state's 
conduct and/or deciding to authorize or order 
any sanctions. The Soviet veto of the Council's 
resolution ordering economic sanctions against 
Iran is therefore characteristic of these sys-
temic difficulties. In view of the U.S. Govern-
ment's prominent role in the tidal wave of 
world condemnation of the Soviet Union's 
massive act of aggression in unlawfully invad-
ing Afghanistan, a Soviet veto was largely fore-
gone. 
What then are the permissible sanctions in 
self-help to deter or to terminate unlawful 
deprivations by a foreign government against 
aliens? Traditional customary international law 
permitted the state to which the alien owed al-
legiance to use all necessary forms of sanc-
tioning strategies from harsh diplomatic notes 
to the substantial application of armed force. 9 
Today, under the U.N. Charter, a state dearly 
may employ in self-help all sanctioning strate-
gies short of the threat or use of armed force, 
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without prior authorization by the Security 
Council. 1 " Thus, in the Iranian situation, the 
U.S. Government already has lawfully employed 
certain diplomatic and economic sanctions 
against Iran and lawfully may intensify those 
sanctions in the future. Also, military strategies 
that do not constitute a present threat of use or 
actual use of armed force against a state like-
wise are permissible. Examples are strategies 
already employed by the U.S. Government in 
the Iranian situation, such as the alerting of 
military units or the movement of military units 
under 1 conditions indicating that although the 
future use of miltary forice may be a possi-
bility, no present threat of use or actual use 
of force is intended. 
The crucial question concerning use of sanc-
tions in self-help to protect nationals abroad is 
whether the threat of use or use of armed force 
against the offending. state is permissible under 
the U.N. Charter: the text of the Charter is the 
starting point for analysis. The principal rele-
vant clauses of the Charter are Articles 2 ( 4) 
and 51. Article 2(4), the principal prohibition 
on the use of force, provides that, "All members 
shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations." In 
turn, Article 51 states, "Nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense if an armed 
attack occurs against a member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security .... "Further, both the letter 
and the spirit of the language of the Purposes 
of the U.N. Charter and of the Charter provi-
sions in general, are that states are expected to 
settle their disputes without resort to force. If 
a continuing unresolved dispute situation is a 
threat to international peace, the issue should 
be taken before the Security Council, as the au-
thoritative community agency empowered to 
characterize the situation and to determine ap-
propriate action. 
In discussing the question of the impact of 
---------------.,-----,---------,.--------------1::··· 
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these U.N. Charter provisions upon the use of 
force in self-help to protect nationals abroad in 
situli\tion~ similar to the Iranian case, we shall 
consider first, the use of force for the goal of 
immediate deterrence.· In the situation where 
that goal is operative, the features we posit here 
for discussion are that the alien is threatened 
with imminent, substantial personal depriva.:: 
tion, yet at least a reasonable expectation exists 
that if his government acts swiftly the depriva-
tion can be prevented. Although the situation 
may occasionally be one in which the alien has 
not yet suffered any deprivation, our model's 
factual prerequisites of notice to his govern-
ment of the emergency and of his government 
being able to mount a timely military action 
suggest that the situation more generally will 
be one in which the alien already has ··suffered 
some deprivation, e.g., seizure, and at a later 
date is threatened with an immjmint substan-
tial increase in deprivation, e.g., ~er:lous bodily· 
harm or death or a significant period of penal 
confinement. In our posited situation, the ob-
jective is one of conservation of vital human 
values in an em.ergency situation threatening 
destruc:tion or substantial damage to those 
values. 
When the posited emergency situation arises, 
does Article 2(4) bar use of force inself-help to 
protect one's nationals abroad? Many authori-
ties11 have asserted that Articles 2(4) and 51 
should be ,counte~poised, with the· resu1t that 
only one objective for the use of force in self-
help would be permissible under the Charter, 
the use of force in individual or collective self-
defense, until such time as the Security Council 
takes effective action. Moving from that prem-
ise, some authorities have relied on the con-
cept of self-defense to justify the use of force 
to protect one's nationals abroad.'~ Others have 
challenged whether situations of protection of 
nationals abroad could be viewed, literally or 
in policy, as a response to an "armed attack" 
against the sanctioning state.'" From the latter 
perspective, if the Security Council does not 
act or cannot act with sufficient swiftness, and 
if use of military force were necessary to pre-
vent substantial harm to aliens, their state must 
either passively permit their death or grave 
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damage or else be in violation of the Charter 
by using force unlawfully. That view obviously 
interprets the intent of the framers of the 
Charter to be that regardless of the emergency 
conditions, it would be preferable that any num-
ber of human lives be destroyed or damaged 
rather than risk the potential abuses of forci-
ble self-help in international relations, even in 
the limited instances of emergency situations.'' 
One understands, then, why some authorities 
have relied on the principle of self-defen~e. 
First, since the principle is enshrined in Article 
51, it provides a convenient .d~vicEt to opt out 
of the challenge of confro~ting head-on the 
question of int~rpretation of the prohibition on 
the use of forcein Article 2(4) in the context 
of use of force in ~elf:;h~lp to protect one's na-
tionals, and it allows one to continue to preserve 
at least an apparent verbal symmetry of these 
Charter provisions. Secondly, the use of force 
in protection of nationals, especially in emer-
gency protection, is related to use of force in 
self-defense; there is much t.}J~t,. is an.alogous: 
Both are illustrations of self-help ·to conserve, 
to protect interests. from ~ub~tantialdepriva­
tions by the target state, and i~ sit~ations Uke 
the Ira.n case, where Embassy premises and per-
sonnel are seized, the symbolic identifica~ion of 
those persons with their state is cl.oser th!lnif, 
for example, fifty American tourists 'liad .. beeii 
seized. When one is consiqering the use of ·forci-
bife self-help to dete~ s{ibsta.ntial deprivation of 
11a.tip:q~l by a foreign governme~t in an emer-
gency situation, as we are here, the temptation 
to ll1erge the two is especially strong. 
However, the contexts for these two forms 
of se1f-help are decidedly different and confusion 
of the forms by ti·eating both as self-defense 
is bad thinking and bad policy. It is an argu-
ment that, "equates the protection of nationals 
abroad with . the preservation of the state It-
self."'" The context for the development of 
policy and law as to self-defense against armed 
attack pertains to response to unlawful use of 
armed force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of the defending state. 
"Self-defense, properly understood, is but the 
most dramatic of self-help ... the test for law-
fulness commonly applied is that the target 
state ... is faced with a threat to its territorial 
integrity or political independence so imminent 
that it must itself immediately resort to the uni-
lateral use of the military instrument in order 
to protect itself." 16 The context of the use of 
force in self-help to protect one's nationals 
abroad involves various forms of unlawful ac-
tion of the offending government occurring in 
its own territory against groups of aliens vary-
ing in many characteristics (e.g., number, age, 
sex, reasons for presence in foreign country, 
nature of relationship to their own govern-
ment) and having differing forms and extents 
of personal deprivation (e.g., loss of freedom of 
movement, psychic trauma, physical injury). 
None of these features appears to bear close re-
lation to the objective features of the conduct 
of the offending state in the self-defense con-
text, the substantial use of force in "armed at-
tack," nor to the major interests involved in 
the very continuation of the existence of the de-
fending state, its territorial integrity and polit-
ical independence. Further, the sense of crisis 
level in the perspectives both of officials and of 
the body politic is very high in avowed situations 
of self-defense, and wide latitude is granted by 
international law to the defending state in its 
determination of the necessary and proportion-
ate response of unlawful armed attack. These 
factors might well result in excessive force (in 
destructiveness, in duration and/or in geo-
graphic ambit) being used in self-help to pro-
tect nationals abroad, where a more restrictive 
perspective on necessity and proportionality 
would seem to be required. 17 Indeed, one could 
argue that the news media's highlighting of the 
rather casual reference to Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter by U.S. Government spokesmen 
in press conferences early in the Iranian situa-
tion has served unduly to heighten the sense 
of crisis and of grievance in the American pub-
lic. Correspondingly, this may make it more 
difficult politically for the U.S. Government at 
some future date to continue to opt for non-use 
of military force in the Iranian situation. 
Thus, the conclusion here is that Article 51 
of the U.N. Charter does not apply to forcible 
self-help to protect nationals abroad. However, 
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this does not mean that Article 2 ( 4) of the 
Charter bars forcible self..:help in the emergency 
deterrence situation we are discussing. In brief, 
the framers of the Charter, as rational persons, 
obviously realized that emergencies might arise 
in which aliens could be killed or suffer other 
serious deprivation by unlawful coercion before 
effective U.N. actiori could be taken. Further, 
no basis in policy or practice exists to suggest 
that national officials of the world community, 
at the establishment of the United Nations or 
today, would interpret Article 2 ( 4) to prohibit 
their use of force to protect their nationals from 
such unlawful coercion where forcible. self-
help was the only hope for timely action. "Laws 
are made for men and not for creatures of the 
imagination." 18 To interpret Article 2 ( 4) to 
require a "forced sacrifice" of human values, 
indeed of human lives, on the altar of absolut-
ism in applying the general principle prohibit.,. 
ing forcible self-help would not only invite the 
contemptuous repudiation of governments. That 
interpretation would deny the ultimate goal to 
which Article 2( 4) and the entirety of the Char-
ter are committed : the promotion of funda-
mental human dignity throughout the world 
community. Even in the early years of the 
United Nations organization, so fervent a sup-
porter of the Charter limitations on unilateral 
use of force as ProfessorPhilip C. Jessup, dis-
tinguished professor of international law and 
later a member· of the International Court of 
Justice, recognized the exceptional situation of 
forcible self-help in the emergency deterrence 
situation. "It would .seem that the only pos-
sible argument against the, substitution of col-
lective measures under the Security Council 
for individual measures by a member state 
would be the inability of the international orga-
nization to act with the speed requisite to pre-
serve life." 19 Thus, properly interpreted, Arti-
cle 2(4), like any proscription of law, is subject 
to limitations in applica1;ion by exceptionaJ situ-
ations, here the need for forcible helf~heip to 
protect nationals in an emergency deterrence 
situation. As regards the Iranian situation, if 
the crisis were. to escalate, for exainple, by 
the threat of imminent death or injury to the 
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American hostages, and a reasonable appraisal 
of the circumstances indicated that immediate 
forcible self-help without the delay of securing 
Security Council authorization or other com-
munity action was the only means of preventing 
this new and more serious deprivation to Ameri-
can citizens, forcible self-help would be per-
missible under the Charter. Of course, the U.S. 
Government would be obligated to give immedi-
ate notice to the Council and would be subject 
to Council appraisal of the decision to use 
force and the manner in which force was used 
in the situation. 
We have been discussing the permissibility, 
under the Charter, of forcible self-help to pro-
tect nationals in an emergency deterrence situa-
tion. What of the situation where a foreign 
government already is subjecting aliens to un-
lawful, continuing coercion that is not so in-
jurious as manifestly to threaten imminent 
death or serious injury, yet is a very substantial 
deprivation of their rights in the protection of 
their person and of their civil liberties? Un-
doubtedly, this describes the situation of the 
American hostages in Iran, as of this writing. 
In that situation, the sanctioning goal of the 
U.S. Government is not that of emergency de-
terrence, but of restoration, the termination of 
the continuing, unlawful confinement of the 
American hostages and of the deprivational con-
sequences and risks associated with that con-
finement under the current circumstances in 
Iran. The question is whether forcible self-help 
by the U.S. Government in this restoration sitl1-
ation would be permissible under the U.N. Char-
ter. Obviously, if the Security Council author-
izes the United States to act, forcible self-help 
in accord with whatever conditions were set by 
the Council would be permissible. (Here, ac-
tion by the United States would be both in 
self-help and to vindicate Security Council au-
thority under the Charter.) Correspondingly, if 
the Council, exercising its Charter authority to 
which the U.S. Government is subject, refused 
to authorize forcible self-help by the United 
States, then U.S. use of force would be imper-
missible. The Council would have authorita-
tively characterized the current Iran situation 
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as one not presently justifying the use of armed 
force. 
However, what if the Council was prevented 
from functioning to authorize forcible self-help 
by the United States, due to the exercise of th.e 
veto power by one of the Permanent Members? 
We have already noted the Soviet veto of the 
U.S. request for Security Council economic 
sanctions against Iran. Just as likely is the 
probability of a Soviet veto of any proposal that 
the Council authorize forcible self-help. Our 
conclusion is that whenever the Council, rather 
than acting by majority vote t9 disapprove the 
use of forcible self-help, is prevented by the 
veto power from acting to express existing ma-
jority support for authorizing forcible self-
help, unilateral decision to use force in self-help 
is permissible under the Charter. "A rational 
and contemporary interpretation of the Char-
ter must conclude that Article 2( 4) suppresses 
self-help insofar as the organization assumes 
-
the role of enforcement. When it cannot, self-
help prerogatives revive." 20 Much of the pre- ,--
ceding discussion concerning the permissibility 
of forcible self-help in im emergency deterrence 
situation when timely community action is im-
possible under optimum operation conditions 
applies with even greater vigor to the problem 
of the failure of the Council to be able to func-
tion due to the exercise of the yeto power. 21 That 
this is the proper interpretation of the limita-
tion on use of force under Article 2 ( 4) is sup-
ported both by interpretation in accord with the 
principle of effectiveness in implementing the 
principal purposes of the U.N. Charter and with 
the principal of subsequent conduct of the 
parties to the Charter for nearly thirty-five 
years. 22 To interpret . the Charter otherwise 
would be "an invitation to lawbreakers who 
would anticipate a paralysis in the Security 
Council's decision dynamics." 23 Indeed, with 
the inability of the Council to act, to hold that 
a state "can, with impunity, attack the na-
tionals ... of other states without any fear of 
response ... is simply to honor lawlessness." 2~ 
We have concluded that forcible self-help to 
protect nationals from substantial unlawful dep-
rivation by foreign government is permissible 
under the U.N. Charter in emergency deter-
rence situations and, if. the Security Council is 
prevented by veto from functioning to author-
ize forcible self-help, in restoration situations. 
This conclusion does not suggest that, if not 
barred by the Charter, forcible self-help is with-
out limits. Under contemporary conventional 
and customary international law, all uses of 
armed force, in any context, are subject to the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality. 
As regards the question of forcible self-help by 
the United States at some point'in the Iranian 
situation, factors to be considered in the situa-
tion existing at that time would include: (a) 
the present extent of deprivation in terms of 
such criteria as the type of deprivation and the 
number, sex, age and health of the nationals; 
(b) the imminency of further deprivations and 
their anticipated extent under the same criteria; 
(c) the outcome of prior attempts to secure 
lawful conduct of the offending government 
and the anticipated outcome of any further at-
tempts to protect one's nationals without use of 
force; (d) the degree of expectation that forci-
ble self-help would achieve the goal of protec~ 
tion, involving such criteria as the anticipated 
extent of resistance by the offending govern-
ment to the military operation; the extent of 
violence that· the offending government or its 
citizens might exercise against the foreign na-
tionals because of the exercise of forcible self-
help, and the extent of the risk of death or 
injury to one's nationals by the self-help opera-
tion itself; (e) the destructiveness of the weap-
onry to be employed, and the planned duration 
and geographic ambit of the military operation, 
and (f) the extent of the risks of death or in-
jury to noncombatant citizens of the offending 
state or of third states. If a good faith, knowl-
edgeable appraisal of the then-existing Iranian 
situation under this framework of analysis pro-
vided an affirmative response to the require-
ments of necessity and proportionality, United 
States use of forcible self-help would be per-
missible. If not, then regardless of the thresh-
hold question of U.N. Charter limits on forcible 
self-help, forcible self-help in the particular in-
stance would be impermissible under interna- . 
tionallaw. 
37 
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FOOTNOTES 
'''Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 
College of William and Mary, B.A., M.A., LL.B., Uni-
versity of Southern California; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale 
University. 
1 Fifty Americans are confined in the U.S. embassy 
building in Teheran, and three in the premises of the 
Iranian Foreign Ministry. Two of the Americans at 
the embassy are private citizens. 
• Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular 
Rights Between the United States of America and 
Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899. All quoted provisions of the Treaty 
are from Article II. 
"Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949. 
T.I.A.S. 3365. Article 34 prohibits taking civilians as 
hostages and Article 33 prohibits reprisals. · 
4 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 500 
U.N.T.S. 95; 23 U.S.T. 3227; T.I.A.S. 3227. 
5 Articles 29, 31 and 37. 
"Article 9. 
7 Article 44. 
• As regards the customary international law on the 
protection of aliens, see concise discussion and au-
thorities cited in Lillich, "Forcible Self-Help by States 
to Protect Human Rights," 53 Iowa L.R. 325, 326 et 
seq. (1967); Mirvahabi, "Entebbe: Validity of Claims 
in International Law," XVII-4 The Military Law and 
Law of War Review 627, 648 (1978). 
• See authorities cited supra, note 8. See, also, Lillich, 
"Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brown-
lie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives," in 
Moore ( ed.), Law and Civil War in the Modern 
World 229 ( 197 4), citing various authorities. 
10 Thomas & Thomas, Non-Intervention 312 (1956); 
Lillich, supra, note 8. Both in drafting and in prac-
tice for nearly thirty-five years under the Charter, 
the state parties have. restricted the. Charter limita-
tion on sanctions in self-help to. those involving threat 
or use of armed force. 
" See discussion in Lillich, supra, note 8, at 334, 337; 
Mirvahabi, supra, note 8, at 645; Wright, "The 'Legal-
ity of Intervention Under the United Nations· Char-
ter," 51 Am. Soc'y Jnt'l L. Proceedings 79, 88 (1957). 
"Apart from self-defense and colleCtive self"defense, 
self-help by states is now illegal." Brownlie, ''Hu-
manitarian Intervention," in Moore (ed.), s;_pra, note 
9, 217. 
12 E.g., Bowett, Self-Defence in International" Law· 92 
(1958); Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of 
Force by Individual States in International Law," 81 
Recueil des Cours 455 (II-1952) ; Fenwick, "The 
Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collective Self-
Defense," 60 Am. J. Int'l L. 64 (1966) ; Mirvahabi, 
supra, note 8, at 632,.-637. 
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13 See discussion in . Lillich, supra, note 8, at 337; 
Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by 
States 299-3'o1 (1963). 
,. "It is true that the protection of nationals presents 
particular diffic'ulties and that a government faced 
with a deliberate massacre of a considerable number 
of nationals in a foreign state would have cogent rea-
sons of humanity for acting, and would also be under 
very great political pressure. The possible risks of 
denying the legality of action in a case of such ur-
gency, an exceptional circumstance, must be weighed 
against the more calculable dangers of providing 
legal pretexts for the commission of breaches of the 
peace in the pursuit of national rather than humani-
tarian interests." Brownlie, supra, note 13 at 301. 
'" Lill_ich, s'!tpra, note 8, at 336. 
"McDougal, "Authority to Use Force on the High 
Seas," XX Naval War College Review 19, 29 (Dec. 
1967). Mirvahabi, supra, note 8, at 632-637, applies 
the concept of self-defense extensively in analyzing 
the permissibility of the Israeli use of forcible self-
help in the Entebbe situation, with no apparent rec-
ognition of the differing contexts of use of force in 
self-defense and in protection of nationals abroad, yet 
gives only cur!;ory mention to the application of self-
help to protect nationals as a· sanctioning strategy 
under the international law of protection of aliens, at 
648. 
'
7 
"The use of self-defense terminology instead of hu-
38 
manitarian. intervention phraseology, however, evokes 
more readily natio-na(security fears that occasionally 
may lead to more extensive uses of force." Lillich, 
supra, note 8, at n. 77,-337-338. 
18 Westlake, International Law 306 ( 1902). 
'"Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations 170 (1949). 
20 Reis:r:nan, Nullity and Revision 850 ( 1971). See also, 
Lillich, supra, note 9; N anda, "The United States' 
Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on 
World Order-Part I," 43 Denver L.J. 439, 458 
(1966); McDougal, supra, note 16, at 28-29; Lillich, 
supra, note 8, at 344-345. 
21 
"Surely to require a state to sit back and watch the 
slaughter of innocent people in order to avoid violat-
ing blanket prohibitions against the use of force is 
to stress blackletter at the expense of far m:ore fund~­
mental values .... Furthermore, it is a realistic as-
sumption that no state with the capability to act will 
allow its own nationals and the nationals of other 
states to be killed or injured abroad. . . ." Lillich, 
supra, note 8, at 344-345. 
22 See McDougal, supra, note 16, at 28-29; Lillich, 
supra, notes 8 and 9. 
23 Reisman, "Sanctions and Enforcement," in III, Black 
and Falk (eds.), The Future of the International 
Legal Order 273, 332-333 (1971). 
24 McDougal, sup1·a, note 16, at 28. 
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